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Case No. 20140462-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
$TATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
MARIO LOUIS GUILLEN, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Guillen appeals from sentences for attempted theft and giving false 
personal information to a peace officer, both class A misdemeanors. This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 
2015). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Guillen pleaded guilty to attempted theft and giving false personal 
information to a peace officer. At sentencing, Guillen did not look at the 
victim during her victhn-impact statement. The prosecutor co1runented on 
Guillen's demeanor and the court stated that it had noticed as well. Guillen 
then spoke up and explained that his counsel had instructed him not to look 
at the victim. The court accepted the explanation, continued with the 
hearing, and heard Guillen's brief, remorseful statement. The pre-sentence 
recommendation report (PSI) recommended a jail sentence based on· 
Guillen's extensive criminal history. The trial court followed that 
recommendation and imposed concurrent jail terms. 
Is Guillen's assertion that the trial court relied on his inattentiveness 
to the victim in imposing a jail sentence supported in the record; and if so, 
does the trial court's alleged reliance support Guillen's claims of plain error 
and ineffective assistance of counsel? 
Standard of Review. Plain error requires obvious, prejudicial error. 
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ~13, 10 P.3d 346. Ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims raised for the first time on appeal present questions of law. 
State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, ~16, 247 P.3d 344. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary off acts. 1 
Guillen went to Ashley Boyd's apartment uninvited one evening 
under the guise of hanging out. R625:2. Because Ms. Boyd knew Guillen, 
she invited him in and they watched a movie. R625:2. Around 11:00 p.m., 
Guillen fell asleep. R625:2, 46. Ms. Boyd finished watching the movie and 
went to bed around 1:00 a.m., leaving Guillen asleep on her couch. R625:46; 
R625:2. When Ms. Boyd awoke, she found Guillen gone, along with her 
laptop, cellphone, CDs, DVDs, camera, iPod, and zebra print pillow case. 
R625:2. 
Ms. Boyd called police and reported the theft. R625:2 Ms. Boyd told 
officers that she and Guillen were the only people in her apartment that 
evening and picked Guillen' s photo out of a photo line-up. R625:2, 46. 
Officers could not locate Guillen for questioning and eventually a warrant 
was issued for his arrest. R625:2-3. 
1 Because Guillen pleaded guilty, the facts are taken from the 
pleadings, including the presentence investigation report. The pleadings 
are in two different cases, 151900895 and 14901625. Case number 151900895 
is cited to as 895:record number and case number 14901625 is cited to as 
625:record number. The h·anscripts for both the pre-h·ial conference hearing 
and sentencing hearing are provided but not marked with a separate bate 
number. However, duplicate transcripts for each hearing are located in the 
pleadings for case number 14901625 and are referred to as 625:record 
number. 
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Nine months later, Ogden City Police received reliable information 
that Guillen was in the Ogden area and had an active warrant from 
Colorado. R895:4. Officer Bennett, recognizing Guillen from his picture, saw 
Guillen driving and stopped him. R895:4. During the stop, Guillen gave 
Officer Bennett a gym membership card that stated his name was "Anthony 
Zalamea." R895:34. Guillen was subsequently arrested. R895:4. During a 
search incident to arrest, officers found Guillen's New Mexico State 
Identification and marijuana paraphernalia- a small electric scale and 
wooden pipe. R895:4. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
The Plea Agreement 
Guillen was initially charged with theft, a third degree felony, giving 
false information to peace officer, a class A misdemeanor, and use or 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. R895:3; R625:1. 
The State, as part of a plea agreement, agreed to recommend concurrent 
sentencing, reduce the third degree felony theft charge to class A 
misdemeanor attempted theft, and dismiss the drug paraphernalia charge. 
R625:35, 79. 
Per that plea agreement, Guillen pleaded guilty to attempted theft 
and giving false information to a peace officer. R625:77. 
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The Sentencing Hearing 
The court began the hearing by noting that the case was set for two 
purposes: sentencing and extradition. R625:88. The court asked Guillen and 
his counsel about Colorado's extradition request. R625:88. Trial counsel 
stated that Guillen wanted to resolve his Utah cases and asked for good 
time credit. R625:88. 
The State then addressed the court regarding sentencing. R625:88. The 
State recommended that the court follow the PSI sentencing 
recommendation. R625:88. The PSI recommended two concurrent sentences 
of 365 days in jail with credit for 75 days served and restitution to the 
victim. R625:45. The PSI recommendation was based on Guillen's lengthy 
criminal history. R625:47-48. Guillen had convictions for burglary of a 
building, burglary, unlawful acquisition of a credit card, possession of a 
controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and multiple thefts. 
R625:47-48. He also had served time in prison and had a negative parole 
history, with revocations for using drugs and twice absconding from 
supervision. R625:49. And finally, at the time of sentencing, Guillen was 
awaiting extradition to Colorado to face an aggravated 1notor vehicle theft 
charge. R625:45, 88. 
-5-
Ms. Boyd then addressed the court. R625:89. Ms. Boyd stated that 
after Guillen took her property she "couldn't sleep," and was afraid that he 
would "come back and hurt" her. R625:89. Ms. Boyd said that the CDs and 
DVDs were meaningful to her because they were gifts from her parents and 
she would watch and listen to them on her laptop often. R625:89. Ms. Boyd 
stated that she can no longer do that because of Guillen. R625:89. 
After Ms. Boyd addressed the court, the State noted that Guillen did 
not pay attention to her while she spoke: "I find it interesting that the 
defendant doesn't pay attention to the victim during [her] speech." R625:90. 
The trial court responded that Guillen's demeanor "was not lost on me." 
R625:90. Guillen then spoke up, stating that his lawyer told him "not to look 
at [Ms. Boyd.]" R625:90. The court responded, "Oh. Okay. All right. 
Anything else anybody wants to say?" Guillen then addressed the court and 
said that he was "sorry for what I did and hopefully, she can forgive me and 
I've got to do my time." R625:90. 
The trial court sentenced Guillen to concurrent one year terms in jail 
on each of the two counts and ordered restitution in the a1nount of 
$5,691.98 to Ms. Boyd.2 R625:91. The court explained that the reason for the 
2 Guillen is not challenging the restitution order on appeal. 
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sentence was that the PSI "recommended maximum sentences," "and I 
think the recommendation is correct." R695:90. 
Guillen timely appeals. R695:58. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Guillen argues that the trial court plainly erred for allegedly relying 
on his failure to look at Ms. Boyd while she read her victim-impact 
statement as the basis for imposing a jail sentence- and that his counsel was 
ineffective for not objecting. But Guillen cannot prove either plain error or 
ineffective assistance on this record because he cannot prove prejudice, a 
necessary element of both claims. 
Guillen cannot prove prejudice for essentially two reasons. First, the 
record does not support that the trial court relied on his inattentiveness -it 
refutes it where the trial court accepted Guillen' s explanation for his 
inattentiveness. Second, even if the record did support that the trial court 
considered Guillen' s inattentiveness, Guillen has not shown- and cannot 
show-any reasonable likelihood of a different result absent that alleged 
reliance. This is because the PSI recommended the jail sentence based on 
Guillen' s extensive criminal history. The PSI recommendation and Guillen' s 
criminal history are themselves sufficient to support the imposition of a jail 
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sentence. Thus, Guillen' s plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel 
arguments both fail for lack of prejudice. 
In any event, Guillen's plain error argument also fails because he has 
not proven error, let alone, obvious error. Again, the record does not 
support Guillen' s claim that the trial court relied on his inattentiveness to 
the victim, but even if he did, Guillen has not shown that any alleged 
reliance was erroneous. Indeed, Guillen cites to no authority firmly 
establishing that a trial court's reliance on a defendant's inattentiveness to 
the victim during sentencing would be erroneous, let alone, obviously 
erroneous. To the contrary, the pertinent authorities establish that 
inattentiveness and a defendant's demeanor are proper factors to consider 
at sentencing. Guillen's plain error argument thus also fails because he has 
shown no error, let alone, obvious error. 
For essentially the same reason, Guillen has not proven the deficient 
performance element of his ineffective assistance claim. Again, the record 
refutes Guillen's assertion that the trial court relied on his inattentiveness in 
imposing a jail sentence. Accordingly, there was no basis or need for an 
objection by counsel. In any event, as stated, inattention to the victim is a 




GUILLEN HAS PROVEN NEITHER PLAIN ERROR NOR INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Guillen argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial 
court allegedly relied on his failure to look at Ms. Boyd during her victim-
impact statement as the basis for imposing a jail sentence. Br. Aplt. 3. 
Because Guillen did not object to the trial· court's alleged reliance on his 
failure to look at Ms. Boyd, Guillen raises his challenge to the jail sentence 
under the doctrines of plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel. Br. 
Aplt. 6-9. Both claims fail at the outset for lack of prejudice where there is no 
record evidence that the trial court considered Defendant's inattentiveness 
to Ms. Boyd. For essentially the same reason, Defendant fails to show any 
error, let alone obvious error. Nor has he shown deficient performance. His 
request for resentencing should therefore be denied. 
****** 
To prevail under plain error review, "a defendant must establish that 
(1) an error exists; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; 
and (3) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ~13, 
10 P.3d 346. To prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness claim, a 
defendant "has the difficult burden of showing actual unreasonable 
-9-
representation and actual prejudice." State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1259 (Utah 
1993) ( emphasis in original). The prejudice element is the same as that 
required for plain error. See State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) (recognizing plain error and ineffective assistance share a "common 
standard" of prejudice, i.e., absent the alleged error or ineffective assistance 
"the result would likely have been different for defendant"); see also State v. 
MacNeil, 2013 UT App 134, if 42, 302 P.3d 844 (same), cert. granted, 317 P.3d 
432 (Utah 2013). 
A. This Court should affirm because Guillen has not proven 
prejudice. 
Guillen has not proven - and cannot prove - prejudice on this record. 
No record evidence supports that the trial court relied on Guillen' s failure to 
look at Ms. Boyd in imposing concurrent jail terms. As shown, Guillen 
objected to the prosecutor and the trial court's comments and explained that 
he had not looked at Ms. Boyd because his counsel instructed him not to. 
R625:90. The trial court responded, "Oh Okay. All right. Anything else 
anybody wants to say," and continued the hearing. R625:90. Guillen then 
gave a brief statement where he expressed remorse. R625:90. 
The trial court's c01nments support that he did not consider Guillen's 
failure to look at Ms. Boyd in imposing concurrent jail sentences. Rather, the 
record shows that the trial court accepted Guillen's explanation for his 
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inattentiveness, i.e., that his counsel had instructed him not to look at the 
victim. The record further shows that the trial court relied on the PSI 
recommendation in imposing jail terms. R625:90. Because the record does 
not support Guillen' s argument that the trial court relied his inattentiveness 
to Ms. Boyd, it necessarily follows that Guillen fails to show any prejudice. 
But even if the trial court had relied on Guillen' s failure to look at Ms. 
Boyd in imposing a jail sentence-and even assuming such reliance was 
erroneous- Guillen could still not show prejudice on this record. Again, the 
PSI recommended a jail sentence and Guillen' s extensive criminal history 
supported that recommendation. R625:45, 47-48, 88. 
Given the above, Guillen has not proven prejudice and his claims of 
plain error and ineffective assistance may both be rejected on that ground. 
See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770 at 772 (likelihood of 
"different result must be substantial, not just conceivable"); McNeil, 2013 UT 
App 134, ,r,r26, 30, 302 P.3d 844 (prejudice must be a "demonstrable 
reality"). 
B. Defendant has not proven error, let alone, obvious error. 
For essentially the same reason Guillen has not proven prejudice., he 
has not proven error, let alone, obvious error. 
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Guillen asserts that the trial court erroneously relied on his failure to 
look at Ms. Boyd in imposing concurrent jail terms. But as shown, the 
record does not support that the trial court considered it at all. To the 
contrary, the record supports that the trial court accepted Guillen' s 
explanation for not looking at Ms. Boyd. Moreover, the trial court explicitly 
stated that he was sentencing Guillen to jail because he thought that the PSI 
jail recommendation was correct. R625:90. 
In any event, even if the trial court had considered Guillen' s 
inattention to Ms. Boyd, Guillen has not shown that it would have been 
erroneous, let alone plainly erroneous to do so. This is because Guillen 
points to no case firmly establishing that a defendant's inattention to a 
victim during sentencing is irrelevant. See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, 116, 95 
P.3d 276 (error only obvious if "the law governing the error was clear at the 
time the alleged error was made."); State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah 
App. 1997) (error not obvious when "there is no settled appellate law to 
guide the trial court"). And for good reason-it is very relevant. 
Inattentiveness and courtroom demeanor are relevant sentencing 
factors because they indicate a defendant's remorsefulness, overall attitude 
and acceptance of responsibility. See State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, if 58, 191 
P.3d 17 (trial court has "wide latitude and discretion" in determining 
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sentencing; can consider defendant's remorsefulness, attitude). And, a trial 
court can consider these factors when sentencing. See e.g., United States v. 
Harris, 418 Fed. Appx. 767 (10th Cir. 2011) (unreported) (court can consider 
defendant's courtroom demeanor, lack of remorse, and failure to 
acknowledge responsibility for sentencing.); United States v. Gaines, 87 
Fed.Appx. 145, 146 (10th Cir. 2004) (remorse and acceptance of 
responsibility are possible mitigating circumstances); State v. Maestas, 2012 
UT 46, 1329, 299 P.3d 892 (court can consider defendant's lack of remorse as 
aggravating factor); State v. LafferhJ, 2001 UT 19, ,I101, 20 P.3d 342 (in capital 
sentencing proceedings, defendant's lack of remorse, character, and any 
other facts relevant to aggravation or mitigation of penalty can be 
considered); State v. Ashcraft, 2014 UT App 253, 18, 338 P.3d 247 (court 
properly considered victim's injuries and defendant's lack of remorse and 
failure to take responsibility at sentencing); State v. Ward, 2012 UT App 346, 
13,293 P.3d 399 (per curiam) (trial court can consider defendant's failure to 
"take[ ] responsibility for the harm he admittedly caused" as an aggravating 
factor). 
Thus, even if the trial court considered Guillen' s demeanor during the 
sentencing hearing, the court did not err, let alone, plainly err. 
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C. Defendant has not proven deficient per£ ormance. 
Finally, for essentially the same reasons Guillen has not shown any 
error, he has not shown deficient performance. 
To prove deficient performance, Guillen must show that no 
reasonable attorney would have forgone objecting to the trial court's alleged 
reliance on Guillen' s inattention to the victim. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984); State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ,r6, 89 P.3d 162. Guillen must 
"overcome the strong presumption that his trial counsel rendered adequate 
assistance" by proving trial counsel's performance "fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Clark, 2004 UT 25, 
,I6 (citation and quotation omitted). 
As shown, Guillen himself objected and informed the trial court of the 
reason for his inattention to the victim. R695:90. And the trial court 
appeared to accept that explanation. R695:90. The trial court did not dwell 
on Guillen's demeanor, but continued the hearing, allowing Guillen to give 
a brief statement expressing his remorse. R695:90. An additional objection 
by Guillen' s counsel was unnecessary and would only continue to draw the 
court's attention to Guillen's inattentiveness, instead of his remorsefulness. 
See Clark, 2004 UT 25, ,I7 (no deficient performance where conceivable 
tactical strategy existed for not objecting). 
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In any event-as shown-the trial court could rely on Guillen's 
demeanor when sentencing, thus, an objection on this basis would have 
been futile. State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1998) (failure to make futile 
objection is not ineffective assistance); Killpack, 2008 UT 49, if 58 (trial court 
has broad discretion when determining sentences, can consider defendant's 
attitude). 
Lastly, Guillen' s reliance on State v. Ott is misplaced. In Ott, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that Ott's counsel rendered ineffective assistance of 
counsel for failing to object to prejudicial victim-impact evidence in a capital 
sentencing hearing. 2010 UT 1, if 49, 26, 247 P.3d 344. But as acknowledged 
by Guillen, this case does not involve either victim-impact evidence or a 
capital sentencing. More importantly, as shown, Guillen has not proven that 
the trial court in fact relied on Guillen' s inattention to Ms. Boyd or that, 
even if the trial court did so, that reliance was at all improper. 
Ott is thus inapposite. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
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Respectfully submitted on November 25, 2015. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
LINDSE\ 
Assistan ttorney General 
Counsel for A ppellee 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Transcriber's Note: Speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
MR. SHAW: Nos. 8, 9 and 10, Mario Guillen. 
THE CLERK: State of Utah vs. Mario Louis Guillen, 
Case Nos. 141901625 and 151900895. Time set for sentencing. 
And 151900904, it's been set for disposition and extradition. 
THE COURT: Any reason why sentence should not be 
imposed? 
MR. MARSHALL: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Would you and Mr. Guillen like to 
address it? My understanding is Colorado wants him. 
MR. MARSHALL: That's my understanding as well, so I 
guess the first step is to get him resolved here, we certainly 
would ask for credit, which they've already talked about and~ 
assume this Court generally is good about good time, so we 
would ask for that. 
THE COURT: Okay. The State want to be heard? 
MR. SHAW: State will submit it on the 
recommendations. 
THE COURT: Anything else from Adult Probation & 
Paro:e? 




























THE COURT: ~she in any kind of posture to pay the 
restitution? 
MR. SHAW: Your Honor, I do have a victim here that 
would like to speak. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. SHAW: I'd forgot about that. 
THE COURT: Who am I going to hear from? 
MR. SHAW: That's a good question. 
THE COURT: A. Boyd? 
MS. BOYD: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. BOYD: My name is Ashley Boyd. I'm Mario' s 
victim. After Mario took my stuff, I couldn't sleep, every 
Lime I tried, :'d wake up crying and screaming with fear from 
nightmare that he'd come back and hurt me. My CDs and movies 
were all I had. I was content staying home and watching 
movies and listening to music. Every year since I was a 
child, my parents would buy me movies and CDs, I'd stay up on 
my laptop. I can't do that because of Mario. 
1 cry myself to sleep, begging for an answer, why 
me? Why my stuff? 1 can't watch movies with my niece and 
nephew, because Mario took that from us. 
I lived in fear up until Mario got caught. 




























MS. BOYD: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
Anything else? 
MR. SHAW: Well, I find it interesting that the 
defendant doesn't pay attention to the victim during the 
speech. 
THE COURT: Her colloquy, I understand. I--that was 
not lost on me. 
so ... 
MR. GUILLEN: My lawyer told me not to look at her, 
':'HE COURT: Pardon? 
MR. GUILLEN: My lawyer told me not to look at her. 
~HE COURT: Oh. Okay. All right. 
Anything else anybody wants to say? 
MR. GUILLEN: I'd like to say actually I'm sorry for 
what I did and hopefully, she can forgive me and I've got to 
do my time. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, they've recorrmended maximum 
sentences, Mr. Guillen, and I think the recomrnendation is 
correct. 
It's going to be the order and sentence of the Court 
that you're to serve a year in the Weber County jail on each 
of the two c:ass A misdemeanors. I'll run them concurrent, 


























I'm imposing a restitution order of $5,691.98. 
Boyd is the victim, we'll reduce that down to a civil 
judgment. 
MR. MARSHALL: Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Ms. 
MR. MARSHALL: Actually, Mr. Guillen wants to--does 
not agree with the restitution. 
THE COURT: So he wants a hearing on the restitution 
figure? 
MR. MARSHALL: Yes. I apologize. 
THE COURT: State want to be heard? 
MR. SHAW: I guess he's entitled to a hearing. 
can--we can set that out--
THE COURT: Thirty days? 
MR. SHAW: Yeah. That's fine. 
THE COURT: All right. Well set the hearing for 
July 1. 
MR. MARSHALL: I won't be here then, your Honor. 
THE COURT: When will you be here? 
MR. MARSHALL: The following week I'm here. 
We 
THE COURT: July s~h. All right. We'll set it for 
July a=~ at ll:00 o'clock. 
Now, has he signed the extradition papers or is he 
indicating that they want--he wants a governor's warrant? 













THE COURT: All right. Then we'll notify Colorado 
to prepare the governor's warrant. 
All right. So he's doing a year, which is the 
maximum sentence. He's got credit for time served. We' 11 
have a restitution hearing on July 8 th and Colorado will be 
notified to do the governor's warrant to come get him 'cause 
he's not waiving. 
THE CLERK: {Inaudible) 
THE COURT: They show 75 days, yes. Okay. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
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